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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

SOME ASPECTS OF PRAGMATISM AND HEGEL

PHILOSOPHY is still chiefly concerned with its heritage from Kant. He bequeathed it the problem of epistemology, How is knowledge possible? And like so many bequests it has proven to be a white elephant. Philosophy can not get rid of it. But if it keeps it, it is helpless before a cumbersome menace.

The bequest is really made this cumbersome menace just by the conditions of the will. The problem of epistemology is insoluble just because of the form in which Kant has stated it. It amounts to this. Starting with the world on one side and the mind to know it on the other, how can you ever bring the two together? And of course, just because you started with them apart, you can not bring them together.

Pragmatism has gone into court to contest the will and free it from its conditions. It has attempted to make the problem of epistemology capable of solution by denying the impossible formulation. It is not, says pragmatism, a question of a world on one side and a mind on the other. You are asking about the possibility of knowledge, so you must begin with knowledge. That means beginning, not with mind and its object out of relation, but with them in relation.

That is to say, if you are to analyze knowledge you must begin with a situation in which a mind and an object or objects are in a certain sort of relation. And your problem is to say, What is this relation? The logic of pragmatism, then, is an analysis of the part played by the two major terms of knowing in a logical whole in which they are but parts.

But before pragmatism can carry out its programme it has to clear the field of those prior claimants who have tried to deal with the problem under Kant's conditions. Its first business is to contest—contest, strangely enough, against those whom it would benefit, those others who are struggling with the white elephant, the empiricists and the rationalists.

To them both it says, briefly, that they are taking seriously the

wrong part of Kant. They are using his problem, but, like him, not fully appreciating his answer, mind builds the world. Both schools are permitting their solutions to be rendered meaningless by a dead left-over substratum of the given. The empiricists at least have the virtue of accepting their position openly and emphasizing the given. But to the rationalists it is an unbidden guest that yet they do not drive away. Both schools have philosophy turned into absurdity on their hands as a result. For if there is a dead, inert given, knowledge is just the acceptance of this given and so meaningless because without interpretation. Or, if knowledge is interpretation, it is still meaningless because something more than the given.

They are condemned, that is, to end with the same situation with which they began, an unresolved dualism of the mind and the world. Their mental newspaper is divided into the reportorial columns and the editorial columns, and the two are totally different staffs. But the only adequate journal is the journal of opinion where all news is interpreted and all comments presentation of news.

The two elements, facts and meaning, must be wholly correlative. They can be so only if there is no inert datum. So pragmatism has dropped out this datum and taken seriously the other half of Kantianism, mind builds the world. Knowledge is the active construct of an active mind in which every part is active.

Thus knowing is for the pragmatists, not first a diadic relation, but first an interrelated whole. It is not the bringing together of the two detached elements subject and object, but a situation, prior in its wholeness to the distinctions of subject and object. For subject and object get their meaning only from the knowledge relation, so there must be knowledge before subject and object can be talked of. Thus the diversity of subject and object can not be a barrier to knowledge, as it must be for the empiricists and rationalists, for it arises from knowledge and so presupposes it.

The whole of knowledge can, of course, legitimately be differentiated into subject and object, when it is understood that these are not absolute distinctions but only differentiations within an inclusive whole. Similarly it can be differentiated into fact and interpretation or fact and hypothesis. These distinctions are really in the knowledge situation, for it is a complex interrelated whole.

To call it an interrelated unity may seem to be going back to the dualism we were avoiding. But it seems so only through a misconception of the nature of relations. Through the habit of our own ways of making things, we tend to think of relations always as mechanical relations. And of mechanical relations it is, at least in a sense, true that disparate parts are brought together and related so that the relation is subsequent to the parts which already existed

independently. But this is not the only kind of relation, possibly not the most typical. There is the other kind—exemplified in the living organism, the state, the esthetic object in which the whole as a whole makes possible the parts, so that parts and relations are analyzed out of the whole not built into it. And of this kind is the interrelated unity of knowledge.

The differentiations made in the whole knowledge situation are the result of contrast and conflict. Subject is aware of its difference from object only when there is some catch in the adjustment. Your book is a book to you and you are a person sitting rather uncomfortably only when you begin to get tired and bored. In the moment of interest and excitement the whole universe was just the thrilling series of ideas in which you and the book alike were absorbed. In the same fashion the familiar madonna is a woman and child, motherhood or the origin of the holy church or whatever else it means to you without any distinction of the painted surface and the symbolic significance. But given a new art canvas and the shape of the paint spots is one thing, their possible intention another. There has been a conflict in the knowing situation so the elements of it stand apart.

Such a whole, prior to its parts which have being only in the whole, is never static. It is the mechanical construct that is the fixed final thing. The organic whole is a living changing thing. Even the esthetic whole, which is part mechanical, being a made object, has sufficient vitality to change in the sense of presenting ever new aspects and new meanings. The knowledge whole is just a process.

Knowledge is a constant transformation in which every part is evolving something new and is itself being thereby modified. Even the simplest knowing, recognition, is not dead piecing together of a shape and a name. But a shape suggests a name, the name is given new content by this further example of it, the shape new meanings and relations by being surely understood as that particular thing. And this interaction is more obviously true of explanation. The apple dropping from the tree is only a trivial menace to one's head. Algebraically expressed it becomes the basis of a whole mechanical world. And the algebraic symbols get meaning and vitality only in some such specific incident. Or for the final clearest example, consider the knowledge of acquaintance with a person. Reconstruct the first impression of any one you know now very well, and react your own attitude and manner in that meeting. Then follow along subsequent meetings and make the developmental series of changes up to the present relation. The person has become a different person, you yourself have become a different person, and the friendship has

a changed significance. In any knowledge, every part changes every other, itself and the whole.

It is no refutation of this theory of the completely active knowledge that some of our facts and objects are fixed. That cat, for instance, always means luminous eyes and a meeouw. So much does remain true of the cat, but once upon a time we had to learn that in some such active process as we describe. It is one of the certain things of our universe now, but only because it is the deposit of a previous act of construction. The whole process of knowledge is a series of acts. In a sense each situation up to its culmination is complete because in the moment of culmination fact and meaning are completely interrelated. The cat and eyes and meeouw belong wholly together. But again this assured conclusion is taken up into another situation and becomes part of a subsequent problem. Perhaps we meet a bob-cat.

So as each part of knowing, each identification or explanation is a development, in like manner the whole fabric is an interrelating development. The life of the mind is the history of a process that is a series of little processes.

But what marks off each stage? What, putting it conversely, holds together each stage and makes it a whole? And what also holds together the entire series? The organic structure of knowledge is teleological. Every identification marks the achievement of a purpose. If we did not have the purpose, we would never attempt to bring together the fact and its explanation. In fact, if we did not attempt to bring them together we would never be aware of their discrepancy. Life is full of unresolved conflicts, but they do not bother us until they conflict with our particular plans. In fact they are not really conflicts until some intention makes necessary their association.

So knowledge in any particular moment or in its whole creative movement is a purposive construct. A projected design brings together a fact and a theory. If they fit, the design is carried out without any definition of either fact or theory. If they do not and the plan is baulked, then both fact and theory are reconsidered and the plan is modified until they all fit together. Similarly through the whole of life one general tendency is determining the specific purposes, and tendency and purposes are being shaped to fit each other until a unified world of knowledge and act is built.

This means that any act of knowing or of life is a whole and that the whole is shaping the parts. But at the same time the whole is being constructed out of the parts. You have to redefine felines after you meet the bob-cat, so you add new attributes to the eyes and the meeouw. This new larger definition determines the place

and the importance of those two attributes. But those two attributes were essential to make the new definition. Whole and parts work back and forth, each presupposing and determining the other, each actually making the other.

It is obvious that the parts make the whole, but it may be worth while just to say again how the whole makes the parts. Though every purpose of your life had some meaning at the time you formed it, its real significance and value was apparent only when you looked back on it from the point of view of that whole period of your life. Though the dropping apple had some meaning if it hit your head, it is a further thing when you have grasped high school physics. An object is made by its relations and its relations are complete only in the whole.

But meanwhile are we not building on an awfully private world? Have I not one little universe according to the sequence of my purpose and you another quite different perhaps? Yet nevertheless we do live in the same world, and, more significant still, we talk about it. How comes this community, then?

We are not quite as exclusive as we fancy. Your purposes are by no means solely your own business. They are the correlate of actions carried on in a social world. You are cooperating with your fellows in your constructive intelligence. We inherit the meaning of the apple from Newton and know the experience of the bob-cat from a less fortunate neighbor. To a certain degree each man has his own world. Try to make a shipbuilder and a marine painter talk about boats. But above the distinctions is the community of experience. There is a common element in the knowledge of boats even in spite of the difference in interest.

One more protest there is against the pragmatic world. If a man's knowledge is just his own construct, is he not overlooking the real object from which he started? And if he does take it into account is he not distorting it horribly with his whole superstructure of created meanings? And the pragmatist bravely answers: There is not any real object apart from our experiences that enters into our knowledge. Entered in, it is in and a part of our knowledge, and as a part of our knowledge it can not be distorted by knowing.

So, in brief summary, knowledge is a thoroughly active process in which each part acts on every other to create a whole, but the whole, since that is what gives meaning to the parts, is prior to the parts even while it is being created. And because knowledge is a completely active process the paradoxical character of it is best exemplified in the judgment of action, the practical judgment. For when we say that we ought to do something our intention determines what we will do, but the act of doing it has to create the fact and

modify it. Again whole and parts are mutually prior and constitutive.

This is where pragmatism ends. It leaves the world in the course of being created into a continuous whole in a series of steps by purposive minds so acting that they can cooperate to construct a trans-individual world. The world so far as made is an interrelated unity of interdetermining parts with the plan of the whole directing the parts and the parts reshaping the plan of the whole. But the world for pragmatism is still decidedly in the making. The future is undetermined. Mind is building its universe and building it without any guidance from without.

This is what pragmatism asserts. But pragmatism has said more than it has asserted. In fact, it makes a point of denying some of the things of which it almost has convicted itself. For one of its main protests is against any conception of the world as complete, against any limitations on the creative process, any fixed principles to enable reality to share in the constructive process. But how can there be the constructive series without some background of fixed determinate structure?

For you can build a world only if you are sure that that world is amenable to your constructive processes. You can not deal with material on which you can not count. Without the assurance that definite laws are operative and essentially, and so inevitably, operative you will never be able to anticipate the outcome of your manipulations and you must anticipate results to fulfil purpose.

A world to be built of purposive activity must be a predictable world. A predictable world must be a world of definite structure. There are fixed laws that must hold good and have equal reality with the developing process because they alone make possible that process. This is simply to say that the attempt at rationality presupposes a fact world. It is the principle recognized by Professor Dewey when he says that to ask the question whether relations are real or only accidental implies that there already are relations there. If this is true of a part of the world, since the world is continuous, why is it not equally true of the whole? To attempt to establish logical relations presupposes that the world is built on a system of logical relations. Professor Dewey's own commentary on the question has only to be generalized to the whole search for knowledge to make the necessary supplementations to the pragmatic theory.

The search for knowledge is one big question and pragmatism admits that a question presupposes its answer. The process that pragmatism discusses, then, presupposes the already real whole that it tries to deny. And pragmatism has almost admitted this presupposition.

It has almost admitted the position it most vigorously combats and, more interesting still, it has wholly exemplified in itself this detested fact of a structural counterpart. For pragmatism is both a metaphysics and a logic, a metaphysics as the necessary completion of its logic. But metaphysics is the description of the structure of the world of which the logic is the process of knowledge. Thus structure is correlative with process and even pragmatism can not avoid illustrating this principle.

So pragmatism on two counts becomes entangled with a structure. Moreover, pragmatism becomes even further involved with structure. For it not only is a question of structure in general, but has within it a specific description of the type of structure. Its particular type of static real is described in the course of describing its process.

Its method is teleological. Knowledge is a developing purpose creating its own material, reality, in the course of its development. Being purpose, this judgment series is, as we have seen, a complex whole created of parts that are real only in the whole so that they presuppose the whole. The whole thus precedes the process of its own fulfilment, yet must be fulfilled to be real. And in the process of fulfilment every part is interacting with every other. This teleological interdependence of part and whole, created whole and creating interrelating parts, is equally true of any particular instance of knowledge and of the whole unified totality thereof. Always whole reshapes parts, while parts build whole. The completion precedes the course of its own completing, but is real only in being completed.

So pragmatism finds involved in itself not only the general notion of structure, but a specific characterization of that structure. To be sure, the pragmatists buck spiritedly against this unromantic rigidity of reality. They protest because it gives no room for real creation by which they seem to mean total novelty. Yet nevertheless it is there involved in pragmatism.

Pragmatism bucks against this limitation, but it must accept determination. And is not this simply taking the enemy in under another name? If it accepts determination, what remaining reason has it to protest against a fixed total real?

Certainly pragmatism must admit determinism for it admits the continuity of knowledge. This continuity is basic to the notion of its process. You dive into the future from the springboard the past has made. Now certainly the springboard determines a large part of that dive. More directly said, since the problems and the material for the solution of those problems of knowledge at any moment must come from the previous knowledge, surely that previous knowledge determines the future.

Moreover determinism in knowledge would necessarily be basic to pragmatism, for it is, according to its own boast, the logic of science. The one thing that science demands above all others is that the past will make predictable the future, that there are truths to which the future must conform.

So it is senseless for pragmatism to protest against a structural existence on the ground that that means determinism and determinism is limitation. Determinism is already in pragmatism. And further, the fact that it already is in pragmatism makes not only senseless but impossible any protest against the reality of structure. For consider the meaning of determinism. What is the significance of saying that the past determines the future?

The usual first answer is to say that the past contains the future *in potentia*. But this is no answer. It only makes necessary a restatement of the question, What do you mean by possibility?

When you say a thing is possible you may mean only that you do not know what is going to happen, so you are giving a random guess. But obviously this can not be what you mean by possibility when you say that the future is in the past *in potentia*. That can only mean that that past represents part of a whole network of relations of which the future events are the remaining interrelated parts.

Similarly when you consider directly the meaning of the statement, the future is determined by the past. In a sense that must mean that the future is present in the past. But since it is future it can not actually have been in the past. The only intelligible explanation is that both past and future are parts of a more inclusive whole where they are interdependent elements in one relational system.

Pragmatism can not give up continuity. Continuity involves determinism. Determinism involves a structural whole of reality. So pragmatism is dragged to its pet aversion.

Pragmatism again makes a partial admission of this structure in taking up the Kantian view that objectivity is relation into a whole. But if it is to make this admission it must make it completely. The objectivity can not be simply what the object has already been. Part of the objectivity of an object is what it becomes. What it becomes then is contained in essential to the object. What it has been could depend on relations already established. But what it becomes is determined by the whole network of its relations. Therefore, the whole network must be somehow real.

Pragmatism will reply of course that the objectivity itself is in the making. That the object is not all that it becomes until it does become it. But the object is what it becomes just because it is equally true that it could become only what it was. This is just a

special case of the past determining the future and so the future being really in the past. An object can never be more than it is. All that it is governs all of its relations. The whole system of relations is thus again presupposed by the process.

Pragmatism requires a structure to make possible its process, to make intelligible the specific form it assigns to its process, to make explicable the continuity of knowledge, and to found its definition of objectivity. But even beyond and above all these reasons it needs a structure to explain the trans-individuality of knowledge. Pragmatism trembles on the brink of subjectivism. It tries to leap across the chasm by pointing out that knowledge is a shared social thing. But it can not show why and how it is social without turning back to some rational structure that founds at once knowledge and reality. To return to the figure, it can not get across the fatal chasm of subjectivism without some bridge to convey it. It must have an explanation of the sociality of knowledge. And the only explanation of this is some dependable common structure of the universe which means also of the knowing mind as part of that universe.

Finally, and sixthly, some such structure is involved in pragmatism's criterion of truth. I fancy pragmatism is rather proud of having found a criterion of truth away from the old coherent and correspondence notions. But what it has really done is just to take up the coherence notion anew. It has modified it by taking it only in part. Any specific explanation is true when it fits into the purpose immediately at hand. But pragmatism can not stop with this slice of coherence. Knowledge is continuous. There is a process of the whole that carries on through these specific purposes. The truth is tested in any specific purpose by the consequences. What is the great consequence of the whole purpose? The consequence of a particular purpose is a unified whole in which each part finds an adequate place. Must there not also be a unity of the whole in which each part finds an adequate place? But this whole is not realized in any specific purpose, tested in any specific test. For the specific purposes are always the part purposes. What is the whole to which the process of the whole tends as its goal and measure? As a purpose it can not be merely in the future, for as we have seen it is the characteristic of purpose to precede even its own fulfilment. What then must the continuity of the whole of knowledge mean, but that there is a determining whole of reality?

So, it would seem, pragmatism unless it would rest at a half-way house of theory must admit as the completion of its creative stream of reality also a relational static whole of reality. Really this is what pragmatism itself has admitted in featuring as prime exemplification of its theory of judgment the judgment of practise.

Experimental logic has two main starting points, scientific experiment and the judgment of practise. Professor Dewey emphasizes especially the latter. He advances the logic of this judgment as a new logic hitherto overlooked and proclaims it a dangerous omission because the judgment of practise vividly presents certain characteristics which he finds upon examination to be characteristic of other, if not perhaps all, types of judgment. Hence logicians in overlooking this judgment have misconstrued the general character of judgment.

The striking thing about the judgment of practise is its paradoxical nature. It judges about that which it creates. It is not the estimation of an already existent situation, but is the estimation of a situation in the making and the judgment itself is the chief factor in making that situation about which it is judging. You say, to borrow Professor Dewey's example, I ought to go to a doctor. That refers to a future fact as well as certain given material. It is also at the same time the instrument of the realization of the fact. The decision is what sends you to the doctor. And the whole point of the judgment is reached only after you have gone.

Here is the case of the whole, the judgment, which must be real as the motivating force, real as its plan, and real as a judgment of the whole. But also it is real only as a process, it is being made real. The whole situation is present in the judgment in one sense, yet has to be created in another and at the same time, the present plan is the power that causes its own fulfilment.

The paradox of the judgment of practise that it is at once complete, being completed, and instrument of completion is then extended, though less emphatically in Professor Dewey's statement, to all judgment. For all judgments are seen to be of the same nature. But further must not it be also extended to the whole of reality, for all of reality is a continuous fabric built up by judgments. Then the pragmatic reality is, as we have been trying to prove, both completed and in the course of being made. It is both structure and process.

That the judgment of practise is the type of all judgments in experimental logic is central to the whole theory, as I have before hinted. For the theory is activistic. Knowledge is conceived of as a construct. Thus the judgment of activity is supremely typical. And so the paradox of the judgment is typical. Moreover, this judgment is inevitably taken as typical by experimental logic because, as that logic points out, for one of its basic assertions, knowing is purposive. Now the judgment of action is the explicit formulation of purpose. That is an equally valid name for it, the judgment of purpose. Hence the nature of this judgment will be the clearest evidence for the nature of purposive process like knowing.

The judgment of practise is central to experimental logic because it is the judgment of purpose. Has it not then been taken into account by previous logicians? Is the logic of purpose new to logic? Rather it is central to one previous logic. As to Professor Dewey, so also to Hegel the logic of purpose is the most revealing logic and the most general structure of judgment.

And to Hegel as to Professor Dewey the striking characteristic of purpose is its paradox. He, too, sees that purpose is a complex interrelated whole, a whole controlling its parts, yet at the same time a whole which must be made through its parts even while it generalizes its own fulfilment and guides it. The analysis of the judgment of practise in Essays in Experimental Logic has been almost point for point anticipated by the analysis of purpose in both Hegel's *Phænomenology* and the *Logics*.

In fact, has not the whole of pragmatism been anticipated by Hegel? One can almost see pragmatism shudder at the thought. It visualizes its free voyaging into the world of its own creating clamped and controlled by a block universe with no hope of novelty ahead. It is always hard to break a colt to harness.

But after all, is the Hegelian harness so obnoxious as our pragmatistic colt supposes? Is it a rigid foreign thing designed solely to limit? Is it not rather as a matter of fact just the inherent tendency or purpose or whatever other pragmatic name you care to disguise it under? Is it not really, as we have suggested before, just that which makes the colt useful and humanly significant?

But first to substantiate our statement that pragmatism is Hegel resaid or rather a part of Hegel resaid. The point is clearest in the *Phænomenology*. The *Phænomenology* is the description of the development of judgment. It begins as does pragmatism with a unified situation. Out of this situation is analyzed fact and identification, subject and object. These elements identified out prove ill adjusted and the situation goes through the process of adjustment, resulting in another situation. This situation again falls into its parts, which, being not fully congruent, interact until another moment of stability is established in a further stage, and so on.

Differentiations within the whole are essential. They are made by contrasts. Anything is defined by its negative relations, its conflicts with that which it is not. Contrasts, or more accurately discrepancies, are also the source of the movement of judgment, a movement which is continuous, though continuous through a series of stages. The organization of each stage is teleological and also the organization of the whole. And the stages are distinguished by the different characters of the purposes that direct them. Each stage makes its contribution to the whole, but the progress of the whole

in turn bends back and modifies the stages that have gone before. The movement is not a subjective, but a transsubjective reality. And it is not an externally imposed movement, but inherent in the process.

Such, with the almost absurd inadequacy of unavoidable brevity, is the movement depicted in the *Phænomenology*. And so far it parallels point for point with the logic of experimentalism. It parallels, but, of course, it differs too.

One difference that the pragmatists themselves would probably emphasize is that the logic of experimentalism is specific, that of Hegel general. Pragmatism, that is, rests on the specific purpose as determining its particular situation. It is because we have just one particular aim that we are concerned with such judgment. Hegel they would probably count a complete alien because he talks about such abstractions as categories.

But this is not as great a difference as it would seem. For in the first place the *Phænomenology* does not talk about bare categories, but does describe very specific situations. It deals with the scientist, the Greek citizen, the Christian, and so forth. Of course, it deals with them as types and deals with them as examples of situations that could be reduced to terms of categories. But yet it is dealing with specific facts and so proving that facts are the basis of its logic.

And in the second place no logic can be really very specific anyhow. For it is a statement of the conditions of knowing and those conditions must be withdrawn from particular details to be considered in their essential characteristics. Even *Experimental Logic* talks about Purpose, not this purpose or that, and about Fact rather than any particular fact. The main difference between the generalizations of pragmatism and the generalizations of Hegel is that Hegel has created a new vocabulary for his that makes the objects of his discourse seem wholly foreign.

Similar to the distinction of the specificness of pragmatism and the abstract generality of Hegel is the distinction in their starting-point for the definition of a person. Pragmatism is talking about the biological person and turns back to biology for corroboration. Hegel talks of the logical person and makes it part of the business of logic to formulate the characterization of that person.

Again the difference is more apparent than real. For the logical person is not other than the biological, but only the generalized formula for the most central facts about the person, revealed not only by biology, but also by psychology and sociology. The logical person is a teleological whole realizing itself through an organized multiplicity of activities in a social milieu essential to it because con-

stitutive of its content of living. The biological person is a man following out a pretty well-defined purpose which involves many particular purposive undertakings in a social world of which he is part and to which he must adjust himself. It is the same man in different words.

A third point of difference is in the statement of the nature of the motive force that keeps the process of knowledge moving. For pragmatism the individual person's dissatisfaction causes him to readjust the definition of his fact. For Hegel there is some inherent force within the process that brings together the factors and makes them readjust themselves to each other until friction is minimized. But again this is but another phase of the difference in statement. For pragmatism, as for Hegel, the person is a force within the situation that makes for its development. Moreover, the sole motivation can not come from the person, for really it is the character of the fact and of the interpretation also that makes necessary the readjustment and decides the direction of that readjustment. Hegel with his inherent movement has simply generalized this same fact.

The plan of Hegel's development movement is, in one respect, quite different from that of the experimental logic. For Hegel has delineated a whole hierarchy of kinds of purpose. Pragmatism has made but little attempt to group its purposes into typical classes, describing the process of judgment only as the sequence of particular purposes regardless of their type.

Yet pragmatism has recognized that there are different types of purpose, different classes of judgments. There is a difference for it between the common sense judgment and the judgment of science. There is a difference again between both of these and the judgment of value.

And pragmatism has already hinted here and there at some notion of the subordination of types. The scientific judgment is evolved from common sense and supersedes it because superior to it. These again are both subordinate to and contributory to the judgment of value. And one pragmatist has suggested that probably within the realm of moral value there is an hierarchy of valuations. This would in a fragmentary, undeveloped way express the Hegelian idea of seried types of judgments, each completing the type below it and preparing for the one above.

The main difference between the pragmatist series and the Hegelian would be that within the first there would be no place for any experiences of doing and suffering, only account given or deliberate reflection; whereas Hegel recognizes a logic of the unreflective also. There is actually present in all experience some structure that should be analyzed and stated in general terms. And this

structure will be continuous in kind with the higher reflective experiences even if not deliberately formulated in judgment, because in any experience the person is involved and so the mark of the person is upon it.

Pragmatism in making its own statement of its divergencies from Hegel would, I fancy, insist upon a point that I have not even mentioned in summarizing the theory. For pragmatism the judgment is complete only in the act and the act is the criterion of the truth of the judgment.

It has seemed unnecessary to mention this in spite of the fact that the pragmatists themselves have made a special point of it, for really the only function of the act is to establish the unity of the various parts of the judgment that was expressed in the purpose. The significant thing for logic, then, is not the act, but only the purposive unity to which the act is instrumental. And truth is coherence in this purposive unity. To this Hegel heartily subscribes.

And it is not even necessary to thus minimize the act to make a correspondence with Hegel. For Hegel himself would never minimize it. Who else but he emphasized that the outer is only correlative of the inner, the inner of the outer and the two must go together? Who has so forcibly insisted on the application of this that the intention is unreal without the act even as the act is meaningless without the intention? Hegel would agree with pragmatism that the act is the necessary fulfilment of the judgment.

The minor differences disappear upon examination. We come now to the crux of the two systems, the problem of time. Time is central to experimentalism. One of the most emphatic points of the theory is that time is real, time essentially real, the process of judgment necessarily a temporal process. In this it would seem to directly oppose Hegelian idealism.

As a matter of fact it is a problem just how far this emphasis on time does oppose Hegel, for it is a problem just what the place of time in Hegel is. His statements about it are obscure and sometimes contradictory. But this much is at least clear. He by no means completely denied time, but in the *Phænomenology,* at least, made one of the series of judgmental processes temporal. The development of the specific detailed stages is a development in time in that account, while the general types of mind are coexistent.

Perhaps the real question to ask in this problem of time is, not what is the place of time in Hegel, but what is the necessity of time in experimentalism? The problem is, how far must the logical statement of the nature of experience take account of time? Would the disregarding of time make any significant difference in our account of knowledge?

Experimentalism mentions time very frequently, but really says very little about it. Being a logic, it deals with a relational situation, parts interconnected in a certain order into a whole. The interconnection of these parts may occur in a certain temporal sequence, but it is not the sequence that is important, but is the place in the whole. In fact the sequence can be reversed and the logic of the position be unchanged. The scientific process ordinarily begins with a fact that means a theory; the two, then, are modified to suit each other until the theory seems congruous, and an act is thereafter performed, the experiment, to prove the adjustment of fact and theory and finally establish it. But is not there also a case where the theory is the starting-point, no one specific fact having called it forth, but only the cumulative suggestion of all experience? Experiments are performed to get facts to fit into them and the final test is not any specific experiment, but the congruency of the theory with a whole knowledge system. In short, it matters not in what order in time the elements occur. The determining issue is the organization of them into this type of whole. Not time, but relations is the subject-matter of logic, and of experimental logic at that.

Even the difference of time between the experimental and the Hegelian systems disappear. There remains but one distinction making a great cleft between the two, the question whether there is, in addition to the real process, also a real stable structure. We have tried to show that pragmatism can not logically retain even this distinction, that she must accept the concept of the stable structure because it is already involved in her theory. If she does accept it pragmatism becomes one with Hegelianism. But pragmatism not only continues to be unwilling to dissolve into Hegelianism, but even makes redoubled efforts to combat that type of idealism. It will be necessary to see what offensive positions she can take against that theory in order to find out whether they will suffice to defend her from absorption into Hegel.

Pragmatism seems to have two main protests against idealism, first, that it is dualistic, second, that it denies all distinctions. Pragmatism points out its superiority in that, first, it is not dualistic, and, second, that it leaves room for all manner of distinctions. Now either idealism is not dualistic and so has no distinctions so that only the second protest of pragmatism holds, or it is dualistic and so has distinctions so that only the first of the arguments holds. Or it can be both dualistic and have distinctions and yet be monistic and transcend its distinctions. If idealism is not to be permitted a dualism, it is difficult to see how pragmatism justifies its distinctions. Or if pragmatism is not to be permitted an underlying unity it is still more difficult to see how pragmatism can hold on to its unity.

And finally if idealism is not to be permitted to keep both distinctions and unity, it is impossible to see how pragmatism can hold on to both. In short, idealism and pragmatism stand or fall together, which tends to corroborate the theory that they are essentially the same.

For the sake of clarity and conviction the points have to be dealt with in more detail. Pragmatism accuses idealism of dualism. Idealistic logic begins with a mind on one side and an object on the other, just as Kant did, and then undertakes the impossible task of bringing them together. The criticism has been directed specifically at Lotze and Bosanquet. Of them it may or may not be true. That is of no moment in the present discussion. Certainly it is not true of Hegel. He, like the pragmatists, begins with a knowledge situation that is a whole through and through within the realm of knowledge.

Hegel, then, not being guilty of dualism, must be thrown to the other horn of the dilemma. He has a world without distinction of subject and object. But he has that world only in the same sense that the pragmatists have it. He has a knowledge situation known through and through, but with distinctions in it made by conflicts.

The pragmatist retorts that the difficulty for idealism is that in that theory these distinctions are fixed distinctions, final stable things. It is one of the main contributions of Hegel's logic to have emphasized the point that no distinctions are fixed but all are transcended and taken up into a more inclusive unity. The distinctions are fixed in the sense that they are still discoverable in the larger principle that resolves them, if that larger whole is analyzed. Does pragmatism deny this? But they are not fixed in the sense that they are insuperable. This is *aufhebenheit.*

Another protest is made, that for idealism it is the same object that common sense knows and that science knows. Hence the difference between the air of the man in the street and the air of the scientist is incomprehensible. This is really just a specific application of the dualism-fixed distinction criticism. If the object is given as a fixed, established thing two disparate knowledges of it do make an insoluble problem. There is no such problem for Hegel. It is the business of his logic to show that the object is the same, because one continuous development of knowledge has brought scientific air out of common-sense air; and different because of the progress of knowledge from common sense to science. This is pragmatism's own reply.

But pragmatism has another retort in a restatement of the dualism criticism. The place of an object external to knowledge is taken in absolute idealism by the absolute. The dualism here is between the absolute as a self-existent, eternal real and the finite subject as

involved in a process. Though distinctions may be resolved in the process they are fixed in the absolute. Though one object may be as different as the air of common sense and the air of science in the process of knowledge, it is just one fixed definite thing with a fixed place and relations in the completed system of the absolute. So we are brought back to the dilemma of any dualism in knowledge. Either knowledge must be of the fixed object of the absolute or of the changing object that appears in the process. If the former, since we can know only by the process, we can never have knowledge. But if the knowledge is the knowledge gained in this process, then it is not knowledge of the real, which is the fixed entity of the absolute. So in what sense is it knowledge?

Idealism stands or falls with its ability to meet this criticism. Its theory demands both parts of the dualism. To make the process intelligible the structural unity must be retained. The structural unity is actual in life only through the process. The two must both be kept to make an adequate theory of the universe. But it will not be an adequate theory unless the two can be made coherent. Can this dualism be bridged?

The dualism of absolute and actuality can be and is bridged in Hegelian idealism. And it is bridged simply because there is no dualism there. Absolute and actual process are not two segments apart. They are two aspects of one fact. The structural relations are present in the process giving it its form. The process is the carrying out of that structure and takes place only in the structural background. The absolute is the statement of the relational system present in this world. The events of this world or the judgments of knowledge are different specific cases of these general relational types. The system of relations that is called the absolute is all that makes possible the processes of the world and of thought. Those processes are all that make actual those relations.

Thus idealism accepts the pragmatic retort that the knowledge of an object is only the reproduction of a fixed object, that the process of judgment is only an approximation to the absolute. Judgment is the establishing of relations. The possibility of establishing relations rests on the reality of a relational structure in the universe. Knowledge must be reconstruction of a real character of the world.

But in accepting this pragmatic criticism idealism denies that it is an adverse criticism. Pragmatism seems to feel that the presence of a fixed object is a drawback for three reasons. First, does it not throw us back into the old subject-object dualism? Second, does it not limit the extent of knowledge, that is, establish a point at which further knowledge is impossible because the fixed object is fully explored? Third, how does it leave possible the difference in any object

for common sense and for science? Pragmatism protests in the name of a unified knowledge situation, in the name of endless possibility of discovery and in the name of the object's disparity in different knowledge contexts.

The fixed object of idealism is really open to none of these objections. There is no dualism between the object in the absolute system of relations and in the judgment because that judgment is simply the statement of those relations which are not different in kind, but simply the skeleton of knowledge. The fixed object does not, in the second place, limit the range of knowledge but alone makes that knowledge possible. How could you know a thing that had no determinate character? And there is possibility for endless development of knowledge because in the system of the whole any one object has infinite relations. And third, there is a real difference between the object of common sense and that of science, even while it is one object, because the two ways of knowing are two stages in the statement of the object's relations.

There is even here no great disparity between idealism and pragmatism. For pragmatism, too, it must be the same water that the scientist drinks, that he hears singing in the brook, and that is H_2O. And these various aspects of the one water are only different relationships, relationships that must belong to the thing and so somehow be prior to the knowing process. The apparent gap between pragmatism and idealism is simply due to the fact that pragmatism has not yet made clear, to my mind at least, how it is the same water and in what way the relationships can be established for this water.

Thus idealism admits a dualism that yet is no dualism. The world is both a structure and a process and the structure is the structure of the process. This throws it onto the other pragmatic criticism. If the dualism is not real, but all of reality is this logically interrelated whole, is not judgment, the establishing of logical relations, wholly futile? If the world is rational why set out to make it rational? Or, more specifically, if the world is so rational that a dialectic theory of knowledge like Hegel's can show its rationality, does not that dialectic demonstration do the work of knowledge once for all, and make further judgment unnecessary?

To consider the latter form of the criticism first, is it true that a dialectical theory of knowledge like Hegel's completes science forever? Assuredly this is a caricature of Hegel. For the theory of the dialectic is only an exposition of the general types of relations to be found in reality and knowledge and in the interrelation of those relations. Pragmatism does the same thing in a much smaller way when it delineates the logic of the judgment. Does the information that a purpose makes the mutual modification of a fact and of

an interpretation until they are congruous render superfluous all adjustments of facts and their interpretations? Then no more does the knowledge that the defects of the sense judgment demand its development to the perceptual judgment make unnecessary sense and percept judgments. Logic is the statement of characteristic relational forms. Knowledge of the forms does not supplant utilization of them.

The dialectic theory is in application a method even as is the pragmatic logic. It is a way of organizing life and knowledge. The consciousness of the method is not essential for knowledge in either theory, for the logic is only the *ex post facto* analysis of knowledge. But knowledge is probably made more efficient by an explicit awareness of the method. To this surely pragmatism would agree.

The objection, then, that for Hegel logic is to take the place of all knowledge is obviously absurd. But this does not meet the general criticism that in a rationally made world rational criticism is futile. The answer to that is of course a further consideration of the Hegelian system. The established whole is infinite. The serial reconstruction by the judgment is finite. Since the finite individual as finite does not possess the infinite judgment, the reconstruction of reality is not futile for him.

The pragmatist asks in return why the absolute, if he is complete, wants himself reconstructed in this inadequate fashion by finite bunglers. Of course the question is absurdly anthropomorphic. The problem is not why has the absolute this idiosyncrasy, but is it a fact? Is the universe a fixed structure of relations that is being constantly worked out in a developmental process?

If it is, it is to be frankly admitted that it is a paradoxical universe? But at least it is a familiar paradox and a paradox to which the pragmatists can make no valid objection because it is their paradox of the judgment of practise. It is, in fact, the paradox of all relations. For a relation must be at once relatedness and relatingness.

As for the question of futility of rational thinking in a rational world, idealism has but to reply to pragmatism: "It may cut the nerve of the thought process to put it in a rational world, but to put it in an unrational world is to cut its throat. How know by a rational process a non-rational fact?" Thus if the pragmatist criticism is right, thought is either futile or impossible. And so we come back to the old dilemma pragmatism charges against empiricism and rationalism. Knowledge is either unnecessary repetition or meaningless manipulation. And pragmatism has chosen the latter horn of the dilemma.

But though pragmatism lands in a dilemma, modern philosophy is

deeply indebted to it. For it has done the service of emphasizing the need of concreteness in philosophy, of relation to actual contemporary fact, and of an expression free from ambiguous technicalities.

Modern idealism in particular owes gratitude to pragmatism. For modern idealism has been in danger of floating off into the supernaturalism with which pragmatism charges it. And pragmatism, with its emphasis on the specific and factual, will help bring it back. For pragmatism is the expression of the one part of idealism, the element of actualism. The question for pragmatism is, can one part stand alone?

PHYLLIS ACKERMAN.

NEW YORK CITY.

SOCIETIES

NEW YORK BRANCH OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences, on Monday, February 25, at 8 P.M. in the psychological laboratory of Columbia University. The following papers were presented.

The Influence of Practise on Correlation of Abilities.—GEORGINA STICKLAND.

The relative lowness of correlations found by most investigators may be caused, according to Professor Hollingworth, by the fact that initial ability (which is affected by such factors as chance variability, inequality of previous practise, *etc.*) rather than final capacity has been measured. In the present experiment an attempt was made to measure an approach to final capacity. A homogeneous group of fifteen college women practised color-naming, tapping, adding, mental multiplication, and word-building tests for one hour a week for eight or nine weeks. Correlations between average records were computed at different points of the practise period. A gradual increase in coefficients was found which was followed by a slight decrease toward the end of the experiment. Multiplying—the most difficult test in which least approximation was made to a practise limit—correlated least well. Individuals' best records—the most accurate index of final capacity—showed a relatively high correlation. Practise curves showed an initial rise and a subsequent lowering, which latter occurred at the same point as did the decrease in coefficients. It seemed to the experimenter that there might be a causal

relation of some sort between these phenomena. Where practise improves performance, correlations increase. Where there is a slump in effort, interest—where accidental causes lower proficiency—or where something approaching a practise level has been reached, coefficients remain as they were, or show a slight decrease.

The similarity of the subjects and the dissimilarity of the tests made these results fairly convincing. But the small number of subjects used make it impossible to form, on the basis of this experiment, any definite theory. Further work which is now being carried on along this same line may serve to confirm or disqualify the hypothesis advanced here.

A Psychological Analysis of Play.—CLARA F. CHASSELL.

Readiness of neurones, as defined by Professor Thorndike, has been adopted as the least ambiguous term to utilize in a definition of play. Activity is accompanied by readiness of neurones as a continuous variable ranging from negative through neutral, or zero, to positive readiness; but only that activity which involves positive readiness of neurones is play. Whether one response or another will follow from any given stimulus, other things being equal, depends solely upon the relation between the readiness of the neurone systems involved. Factors influencing readiness are maturity, sex, race, family, environment, habit, instinct, mental set, physiological changes, and intensity of stimuli. Most obvious of these, perhaps, is mental set, or attitude, in terms of which it would be possible to formulate a complementary analysis of play.

Preferably, work may be thought of in terms of product produced (Thorndike). Thus drudgery, considered as activity of neurone systems unready to conduct—not work—is the antithesis of play. Further, recreation and fatigue, from the standpoint of a single synaptic series, may be considered antithetical terms.

From the pedagogical standpoint, this analysis of play finds sanction in the current doctrine of interest. The modern school seeks to increase the satisfactions actually involved in school processes.

A Note on a Mathematical Prodigy.—LORLE I. STECHER.

A boy aged six years and seven months was examined at the Mental Clinic, New York City Children's Hospital and School at Randalls Island. This child who graded seven years and five months by the Stanford Revision of the Binet with an I.Q. of 113, was able to add long columns of 1 and 2 digit numbers as fast as he heard them pronounced, and to subtract with equal rapidity. He had had only one month's instruction at school, therefore this facility in

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mental arithmetic was spontaneously developed. With the exception of one brother, he was the only child in a large family whose mentality judged by school progress was above the average. The family history showed on the father's side a number of individuals of good mentality, including numerous rabbis and one person supposed to be mathematically inclined. His performance, although remarkable for a six-year-old child, hardly compares with the recorded arithmetical feats of such prodigies as Ampère and Gauss.

Families of American Men of Science.—R. BRIMHALL.

A continuation of a study begun by Professor J. McKeen Cattell of the distinguished relatives of a group of 1,000 of the most distinguished American men of science. The number of distinguished relatives in each degree of relationship not beyond second cousins, except in special families, and degree of distinction are being determined. Degree of distinction is being determined by biographical accounts of individuals in "American Men of Science," "Who's Who in America" and Appleton's "Cyclopedia of American Biography." In the last named case, the amount of space given to the biography is used as a measure of degree of distinction. Already, some four hundred relatives not more remote than first cousins have been recorded according to these standards. The relatives of the wives of the men of science are being treated according to the same method.

Redintegrative Mechanisms in the Psychoneuroses.—H. L. HOLLINGWORTH.

Reference was made to various attempts to formulate in psychological terms the symptoms of the psychoneuroses. Special attention was called to the psychoanalytic concepts, such as symbolism, transfer, siphoning, *etc.* Cases were cited from normal perception and learning, from primitive magic, from illusions, and from esthetic reaction, showing the importance of a type of reaction which represents a combination of Hamilton's "redintegration" and Thorndike's "partial activity." The "conditioned reflex" was shown to be a typical case of this mechanism. In general the mechanism takes the following form. Some definite reaction, of speech, conduct, emotion, *etc.*, follows upon a total stimulus or situation. Thereafter the occurrence of a portion of the original stimulus serves to reinstate the reaction previously associated with the larger situation. Clinical examples suggested that this mechanism adequately formulates many of the symptoms of the psychoneuroses in a much clearer way than do the concepts of symbolism, transfer, siphoning, *etc.* Adequate control of this mechanism is what is called sagacity. Sagacity and

intelligence were distinguished. Amentia is a lack of intelligence, whereas hysteria is a lack of sagacity.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Manuel de Psychiatrie. J. ROUGUES DE FURSAC. Cinquième Edition. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1917. Pp. 509.

Treatises on psychiatry may be divided into several classes—*viz.:*

1. Systems of psychiatry of a really creative and constructive type, like Kraepelin's work with its successive modifications and additions.

2. The less elaborate text-book, yet still bearing the stamp of originality, such as the treatises of Krafft-Ebing, Tanzi and Biachi.

3. Contributions to psychiatry which are interpretative rather than descriptive of mental disorders, such as Bleuler's monumental works on dementia præcox and schizophrenic negativism and Freud's interpretation of the paranoiac mechanism.

4. Text-books intended primarily for the student, where interpretation is sacrificed for description and where mental diseases are more or less classified like a botanical herbarium. It is to this latter class that the book under review belongs.

The fact that this book has gone through five editions in the original and several editions in English translation attests to its popularity, and for a brief treatise on mental disorders, written with the usual clearness of French medical works, we know of no more satisfactory work. Its chief fault is that it is too descriptive and not sufficiently interpretative and is apt to leave the student with a feeling that mental diseases are cut and dried entities like different varieties of trees and that the symptoms of mental diseases are the more or less haphazard and accidental vagaries of a disordered mind. Modern psychiatrical analyses have shown that the content of a psychosis is not a wild and disordered outbreak of mental symptoms, but is either the logical outcome of a failure to adapt the personality to new situations in life or arises from circumstances and conditions of which the individual is unaware, that is, an unconscious mechanism. Careful psychological analyses can establish these principles beyond a doubt, such as the reviewer has done, for instance, the psychoanalysis of the somnambulism of Lady Macbeth.

Psychiatry has long ago passed the point of mere clinical description and attempts at various classifications, since the former was

bound to mislead and the latter often reached a point of artificiality, based either on pathological evidence, on the course of the disease or on a more or less illusory grouping of symptoms. It has reached the more fertile ground where the content of the psychosis is being carefully interpreted, as has been done so well by the psychoanalytic school. For instance, in the book under review, in the descriptions of the sexual perversions and the psychoneuroses, nothing is said about the etiology of these disorders beyond a vague reference to "heredity" and "general enfeeblement of the organism," whatever these terms may connote; neither is there any reference to the remarkable curative results of psychoanalysis.

The section on the prevention of mental diseases is one of the best and most comprehensive in the book. The account of the efforts in various countries to enforce prohibition along legislative and educational lines is admirable, likewise the insistence placed upon the susceptibility of different individuals to varying amounts of alcohol.

The classification of Kraepelin is followed in the main, as being the most logical of recent attempts, the result of years of clinical experience, although the paranoiac states are given their usual French designation. It is doubtful if there exists a pure exhaustion psychosis any more than a so-called nervous exhaustion, and happily the latter is being gradually relegated to the limbo of forgotten theories, a fate which will probably soon overtake the so-called psychoses of exhaustion.

He adopts Bleuler's term of "schizophrenia" instead of dementia præcox, as expressing more clearly the exact nature of the disorder. Unfortunately he does not mention Bertschinger's remarkable contribution to the processes of recovery in schizophrenia. It is well known that a certain percentage of these cases get well, but *how* they get well and *why* some recover and some do not, is a most important question even for the student, and it is hoped that this serious omission will be attended to in a future edition. In the section on the nature of the disease no mention is made of Bleuler's really epoch-making contributions to the inner mechanism of schizophrenia and schizophrenic negativism, on which all future psychotherapy of dementia præcox must be based. To state that the treatment of dementia præcox is purely symptomatic, as is done in this book, is a failure to appreciate the really curative results in early cases of the disease by the psychoanalytic method of treatment.

The portions devoted to the paranoia question are likewise inadequate, since there are omitted the essential mental mechanisms which underlie every paranoiac state and which form the basis of the paranoiac misintepretation of actual occurrences. As a contrast, the chapter on paresis is admirable from a clinical and pathological

standpoint, but here again there is no mention of the attempts at a specific therapy of the disorder, which, while not curative, at least seems to retard the progress of the disease.

On the whole, however, the book is a good one for the student of psychiatry who has had no previous training on the subject, and yet even the student will in time, if he observes and reads, be interested less in artificial classifications and more in psychological interpretations of mental diseases, on which the progress of psychiatry, now as in the future, must be based.

ISADOR H. CORIAT.

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Naturalism and Agnosticism: The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the Years 1896–98. JAMES WARD. Fourth Edition. London: A. & C. Black, Ltd. 1915.

This edition differs from its predecessors mainly in the fact that the twenty lectures now appear in one volume. In order to make the volume convenient to handle the detailed table of contents has been omitted. The rather full index makes the loss one easily borne. Besides making numerous small emendations the author has added about a dozen explanatory notes.

But nothing important has been done to bring the work up to date. Of course those who regarded the author's criticism of agnosticism and naturalism as definitive when it first appeared will maintain that the book is as much up to date now as it ever was. These lectures were not intended to develop a positive contribution to philosophy; the contribution that Professor Ward has to make to philosophy is given in *The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism,* the Gifford Lectures of 1907–10, published in 1911. The particular set of lectures now before us again is almost entirely critical, and it might be said that the views discussed and found wanting have not changed since they were subjected to the unsympathetic examination given them by Professor Ward. Such a statement would hardly do justice to the facts. Mechanism and naturalism have changed very considerably in the meanwhile; and if they have by this change ceased to be mechanism and naturalism, there is at least something left as the result of this change. This something remains to be disposed of before a philosophy can gracefully recommend itself to the world on the ground of the failure of all its rivals.

One need only refer, for example, to Professor Jennings's work in the philosophy of biology to find a view that is not naturalistic and mechanistic in Professor Ward's sense of the term, but neither is it anything like Mr. Ward's teleology. The same may be said of Dewey's naturalism.

I find in Professor Ward's treatment of his opponents the trouble that I find in Bergson's; both of them like to put their victims on the bed of Procrustes.

E. B. McGILVARY.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

MIND. October, 1917. *The Medieval Doctrines in the Works of Donne and Locke* (pp. 385–392): FRANÇOIS PICAVET. – A notice of theses done at the École des Hautes Études, one by M. Krakowski maintaining that Locke's metaphysics and theology have their roots in the Middle Ages and that his thought marks no break in continuity; the other by Miss Ramsay showing the medieval and Plotinian source of the thought of John Donne. *Socrates and Plato* (p. 393–406): J. A. STEWART. – Defining Platonism as "the faith out of which 'the Doctrine of Plato' as prophetic message" issues, the question is asked how Platonism is to be affected by Professor Burnet's book, *Thales to Plato*. The view is that Professor Burnet has given too much in the way of a background environment, and too little of Plato as a personality. *Recollection, Association and Memory* (pp. 407–427): J. LAIRD. – Adopting Bergson's distinction between pure memory and memory as motor habit, and the neo-realistic doctrine of simple apprehension as non-representative and as involving a complete duality of process of apprehending and object apprehended, the paper proceeds to show that there may be direct and simple apprehension of past events. *What is Formal Logic About?* (pp. 428–447): ARTHUR MITCHELL. – Finds the subject-matter of logic to be *meaning*, the status of which as public, common and objective is explained. Every meaning has character, a locus, and a co-functionality between them. Finds the fundamental principle of logic to be "this co-functionality between character and locus, in meaning." *Discussions: Mr. Russell's Lowell Lectures:* D. M. Wrinch. *On Relevance:* Alfred Sidgwick. *Formalism and the A Fortiori:* F. C. S. Schiller... *Critical Notes. New Books. Philosophical Periodicals.*

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. November, 1917. *"La religion" de M. Loisy* (pp. 617–626): A. DARIN. – A new development of the religion of humanity. *De la nécessité médiate et de la nécessité immédiate* (pp. 627–692): L. DAURIAC. – A study of two types of necessity in order to clear the way for an understanding of the contingency of the categories. *Les ordinaux transfinis de*

Cantor et leur définition logique (pp. 693–709): A. REYMOND.–Although the words of Poincaré may be true, "that there is no hope of seeing an agreement established between the pragmatists and the Cantorians," the author believes that he can show that the Cantorians' theory of transfinite ordinals is not without contradictions. *Enseignement. La rénovation de l'école:* E. RIGNANO. *Questions Pratiques. De la liberté en temps de guerre:* G. GUY-GRAND. *Nécrologie.*

Goblot, Edmond. Traité de Logique. With a preface by Boutroux. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1918. Pp. xxiii + 412. 8 fr. (plus a temporary advance of 20 per cent.).

Jastrow, Joseph. The Psychology of Conviction: A Study of Beliefs and Attitudes. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1918. Pp. xix + 387. $2.50.

Leighton, Joseph Alexander. The Field of Philosophy: An Outline of Lectures on Introduction to Philosophy. Columbus, Ohio: R. G. Adams & Company. 1918. Pp. xii + 414. $1.50.

The Imperial Japanese Mission, 1917: A Record of the Reception Throughout the United States of the Special Mission Headed by Viscount Ishii. Publication No. 15 of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Division of Intercourse and Education. Washington: Byron S. Adams. 1918. Pp. vi + 125.

NOTES AND NEWS

We are glad to circulate the following letter, addressed to all admirers of Professor Royce:

"Some of the personal friends and colleagues of Josiah Royce, who believe that his work and his character made a deep impression upon a wide circle of men and women, and that he became in fact the center of a large spiritual community, many of whose members were unknown to him, as he was unknown personally to them, feel that the reverence and affection which went out to him as a thinker and as a man should be embodied in some appropriate memorial of him at Harvard University, where he expressed himself in characteristic speech and writing for thirty years.

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"If you desire to subscribe, please send your check to Charles Francis Adams, Esq., Treasurer of Harvard College, 50 State Street, Boston.

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"Lawrence J. Henderson, Secretary, The Royce Club
"James J. Putnam, M.D.
"E. E. Southard, M.D.
"William Ernest Hocking"

The following psychologists have received commissions in the sanitary corps for psychological testing in the army: Albert T. Poffenberger, instructor in psychology, Columbia University, captain; Garry C. Myers, department of psychology, Brooklyn Training School for Teachers, lieutenant; Roberts B. Owen, instructor in philosophy, Columbia University, lieutenant; Schachne Isaacs, instructor in psychology, University of Cincinnati, lieutenant (psychological research in high altitude aviation).

Professor M. E. Haggerty, of the University of Minnesota, has received a commission as major in the sanitary corps of the army. Major Haggerty will be in charge of psychological work in connection with special hospitals and the re-education of wounded and disabled soldiers.

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Dualism and Early Modern Philosophy. II. ALBERT G. A. BALZ.
Estimation of Centidiurnal Periods of Time: An Experimental Investigation of the Time Sense. HARRY CARY.
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Volume XV. No. 10. May 9, 1918

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The Definition of Infinity. RAY H. DOTTERER.
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Subscription $1.25. 200 pp. Founded 1895. Edited by Madison Bentley.
An annual bibliography of psychological literature.

Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods—New York.
Sub-Station 84. Bi-weekly. 728 pages per volume. Founded 1904.
Subscription $3. Edited by F. J. E. Woodbridge and Wendell T. Bush.

Archives of Psychology—Sub-station 84, N. Y.: Archives of Psychology.
Subscription $5. 600 pp. ann. Founded 1906. Ed. by R. S. Woodworth.
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Journal of Abnormal Psychology—Boston: Richard G. Badger.
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Bi-monthly. Founded 1906. Entire field of abnormal psychology.

Psychological Clinic—Philadelphia: Psychological Clinic Press.
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Published without fixed dates. 4 numbers constitute a volume.

Journal of Race Development—Worcester, Mass.: Louis N. Wilson.
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Quarterly. Edited by George H. Blakeslee and G. Stanley Hall.

Journal of Educational Psychology—Baltimore: Warwick & York.
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Monthly (10 numbers). Managing Editor, J. Carleton Bell.
(Educational Psychology Monographs. Edited by Guy M. Whipple.
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Journal of Animal Behavior—Cambridge, Mass.: Emerson Hall.
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Edited by G. Stanley Hall, John Wallace Baird and L. R. Geissler.

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